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A B S T R A C T
Britain's ambitious carbon targets require that electricity be immediately and aggressively decarbonised, so it is
reassuring to report that electricity sector emissions have fallen 46% in the three years to June 2016, their
lowest since 1960. This paper analyses the factors behind this fall and the impacts they are having.
The main drivers are: demand falling 1.3% per year due to eﬃciency gains and mild winters; gas doubling its
share to 60% of fossil generation due to the carbon price ﬂoor; and the dramatic uptake of wind, solar and
biomass which now supply up to 45% of demand. Accounting conventions also play their part: imported
electricity and biomass would add 5% and 2% to emissions if they were included.
The pace of decarbonisation is impressive, but raises both engineering and economic challenges. Falling peak
demand has delayed fears of capacity shortage, but minimum net demand is instead becoming a problem. The
headroom between inﬂexible nuclear and intermittent renewables is rapidly shrinking, with controllable output
reaching a minimum of just 5.9 GW as solar output peaked at 7.1 GW. 2015 also saw Britain's ﬁrst negative
power prices, the highest winter peak prices for six years, and the highest balancing costs.
1. Introduction
The British electricity system emits around 12,000 tonnes of CO2
each hour, and must be radically redesigned for the country to meet
ambitious national carbon targets: a 50% reduction versus 1990 levels
by 2025, and 80% by 2050 (Climate Change Act, 2008; CCC, 2015a).
The power sector will be pivotal as the current strategy is to rapidly
decarbonise electricity during the 2020 s, and then use it to provide an
increasing share of heat and transport. The rationale is that there are
many ways to generate electricity without carbon emissions, and these
are cost-eﬀective relative to the options in heat, transport and industry.
In their Fifth Carbon Budget, the Committee on Climate Change
(CCC) recommends that carbon emissions from the power sector must
be reduced by 75% of their 2015 levels by 2030, and almost eliminated
by 2050 (‒95%) (CCC, 2015a). The targets in other sectors are more
modest, at 20–40% reduction by 2030 and 25‒80% by 2050, with low-
carbon electricity providing a third of these reductions by 2030, and
half by 2050 (CCC, 2015b).
Achieving these aims will require rapid and substantial changes in
the power sector: simultaneously increasing the share of renewables,
biomass and nuclear generation; eliminating unabated coal and then
gas generation; pushing carbon capture and storage (CCS) beyond the
R &D phase; and reducing demand through eﬃciency measures.
These CCC targets for the power sector translate to a reduction in
carbon intensity from around 500 gCO2 per kWh of electricity
consumed, as experienced over the last decade, to 200‒250 g/kWh in
2020 and below 100 g/kWh by 2030 (CCC, 2015a). As shown in Fig. 1,
this will require an 11% reduction each year of this decade, followed by
9% annually next decade. This is double the rate that was inadvertently
seen during the 1990 s dash for gas, which saw 100 TWh/year of coal
generation (and ~40 million tonnes of fuel) replaced by high-eﬃciency
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) (MacLeay et al., 2016).
Fig. 2 shows that there are tentative signs that the electricity sector
turned a corner in 2012 and the required reductions are beginning to
materialise. There are several complementary forces at work, which
have combined to give a 46% reduction in carbon emissions in the
space of just three years:
• Demand is steadily declining by 1–2% per year;
• Coal is being displaced by gas, imported electricity and renewables,
so its share has fallen by three-quarters since 2012;
• The share of renewables is growing rapidly: wind, solar and biomass
now provide one-ﬁfth of demand.
These changes are not as simple as the headline views may seem.
For example, demand has been depressed in recent years due to a
succession of mild winters, which cannot be expected to continue
indeﬁnitely. The share of coal and gas consumption is inﬂuenced by
international events. 2012 saw a fall in gas usage as the Fukushima
disaster increased Japan's need to import gas, the Arab Spring reduced
supplies from the Middle East and American coal provided a cheap
alternative as shale gas forced down US power prices. Between 2010
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and 2012 coal prices for British power stations were level whilst gas
prices rose 50% (DECC, 2016b).
As seen in Fig. 2, an increasing share of electricity is being imported
through interconnectors to France and the Netherlands.1 This elec-
tricity is treated as zero carbon when calculating national emissions
inventories, which conveniently neglects the fact Britain now “exports”
around 3% of its power sector emissions abroad. This accounting
convention implies that importing all of Britain's electricity is a valid
route to decarbonisation, even though French and Dutch fossil power
stations release CO2 to the same atmosphere as British ones.
The growing share of biomass ampliﬁes the uncertainty and lack of
understanding that surrounds the carbon intensity of this fuel source.
The direct emissions from combusting wood pellets would add 13% to
the sector's total if they were not avoided through sustainable forestry
practices.
If understanding the progress towards decarbonisation is complex,
the knock-on impacts of it are almost completely concealed when
viewed through annual statistics. The intermittency of renewables,
structural changes to demand and capacity scarcity cause problems at
the extremes, not at the centre, so these can only be understood with
high resolution data on the power system.
System operation varies dramatically from hour to hour because of
the just-in-time nature of electricity production. Supply and demand
must be balanced in real-time with limited recourse to storage and
demand-side management (Green and Staﬀell, 2016). With an increas-
ing share of generation becoming inﬂexible, semi-controllable and
unpredictable, the system must cope with a widening range of
conditions that will push both the operational capabilities and the
economic rationale of the market.
Britain's electricity system is approaching several critical tipping
points:
• weather-dependent renewables supplying more than 50% of instan-
taneous demand;
• wholesale prices falling negative in both summer (due to solar) and
winter (due to wind);
• solar output forcing minimum net demand below the level of must-
run output (nuclear and CHP).
These will no doubt test the capabilities of National Grid to control
the system, and may necessitate new markets or services, and the
deployment of greater interconnection and storage.
The aim of this paper is to disentangle the various sources of data
on the British electricity system to better understand these trends,
analyse their impacts on the electricity sector, and comment on
whether they can continue contributing to emissions reductions in
the coming years. Section 2 outlines the sources of data and calcula-
tions employed. Section 3 explores the derived statistics, covering
demand, supply, carbon emissions and prices. Section 4 estimates the
contributions that individual technologies and external factors have
made towards decarbonisation, then Section 5 concludes. Online
supplementary material provides further mathematical details.
In an eﬀort to promote transparency and understanding, the data
behind all the ﬁgures in this paper are made available on ScienceDirect.
The processed data can also be explored interactively at www.
electricinsights.co.uk.
2. Methods and data
2.1. Conventions
The electricity sector has many accounting conventions to be aware
of. Power ﬂow is measured in kW / MW / GW; volumes of energy are
measured in MWh / GWh / TWh. Producing 1 GW constantly for a
year will yield 8.76 TWh, which is enough to power 2.65 million homes
according to the common media analogy.2
The chemical energy contained within the fuels is typically mea-
sured in MJ / GJ / TJ, or as million tonnes of oil equivalent (1 MTOE
=41,868 TJ =11.63 TWh), or million British thermal units (1 MMBTU
=10 therms =1.055 GJ) (Staﬀell, 2011). This energy can be expressed
relative to higher heating value (HHV) which is the true thermody-
namic deﬁnition of energy content, or lower heating value (LHV) which
neglects the latent heat of the water vapours produced during
combustion. This makes generation eﬃciencies appear 5–11% higher
when presented against LHV, which remains the industry convention3;
however, HHV is used here as recommended by the IEA (International
Energy Agency, 2010).
Electricity demand equals generation minus losses in the transmis-
sion and distribution system, and may be deﬁned to include exports
and/or in-ﬂows into storage.4 Generation can either refer to the gross
electricity output from a turbine or the net output of a power station,
which excludes the electricity consumed by the station itself.
Fig. 1. The historic and required future carbon content of British electricity, highlighting
the average year-on-year change during each decade. Data from (CCC, 2015a; MacLeay
et al., 2016).
Fig. 2. Biannual generation by type and carbon emissions from the electricity sector.
1 There are also two interconnectors to the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland,
but these predominantly exported from Britain during this period.
2 Assuming 3300kWh per year electricity consumption per household (Ofgem, 2011).
3 LHV was more practical in the 19th century, as heat below 150°C could not be put to
work when burning sulphur-rich coal due to sulphuric acid formation (Staﬀell, 2010).
4 Commonly known as pumping, due to the prevalence of pumped hydro plants.
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Supply and demand are measured in real time by ﬂows into and out
of the transmission network. The major power stations that connect
into this network are metered, but an increasing amount of generators
are now integrated with consumers, making them invisible to national
grid. These are classiﬁed as embedded renewables (predominantly
small wind and solar), and auto-generators (CHP engines and other
generators used in industrial and other facilities).
The exclusion of embedded generation from many data sources is
an increasing problem, as this discounts much of Britain's wind
capacity and all of its solar capacity, both of which have grown
signiﬁcantly. To be speciﬁc, larger onshore farms in Scotland and
oﬀshore wind farms are connected to the transmissions system and
thus are metered by National Grid; all onshore farms in England and
Wales are embedded into the distribution system and thus are
invisible.
There are also numerous captive power stations, or auto-genera-
tors, used in industrial and other large facilities to meet on-site
demand. Britain has 4.6 GW of auto-generators, which were estimated
to produce 2.2 GW during summer and 2.8 GW in winter 2013 (each
7.4% of gross demand) (Boßmann and Staﬀell, 2015). These have
limited interaction with the electricity network as they meet on-site
demand and are not centrally metered, making them eﬀectively
invisible to the system. Unlike embedded renewables, there are no
half-hourly estimates of the ﬂeet's output to work from, and so auto-
generators are excluded from this analysis.
Annual statistics from DUKES could be used to estimate the
inﬂuence of auto-generators, based on two general trends over the
period 2000–2014 (MacLeay et al., 2016). Firstly, auto-generator
output has equalled 9.0 ± 0.4% of the metered supply from major
power producers; and secondly, the composition of auto-generators has
been 65 ± 3% ‘conventional thermal’ (coal, oil, biomass) and the
remainder CCGT. Following from this, auto-generators are estimated
to contribute an additional 17 TWh generation from coal and 9 TWh
from gas in 2015, and thus 19 million tonnes of CO2 (compared to 112
MT from major power producers).5
The conventions used in this paper are as follows:
• Fuel inputs and eﬃciencies are measured against HHV;
• Demand is the total load on the system (including exports, storage
and losses);
• Electricity generation is net of plant self-consumption;
• Supply includes major power producers and embedded renewables,
but not auto-generators;
• Electricity storage is grouped with imports/exports rather than with
run-of-river hydro.
2.2. Sources
The data used in this report are freely available from National Grid
(National Grid, 2016) and Elexon (Elexon, 2016a, 2016b) for supply,
demand and prices, and the Hadley Centre for temperatures (Parker
et al., 1992). Full details of the data sources and processing are given in
the Online Supplement §1.
Data are typically presented from 2009 to the end of June 2016 for
half-hourly data, or to 2015 for annual data. 2009 is the earliest whole
year when high-resolution generator output is available, and this range
also gives a three-year window either side of 2012, which was pivotal as
the year of peak carbon from the British electricity system.
2.3. Calculating Carbon Emissions
DECC compile national greenhouse gas emissions statistics which
are broken down to sectoral level, including electricity generation from
power stations (DECC, 2016c). These are available at annual and
quarterly resolution, and so cannot be used to estimate the real-time
carbon emissions or the contribution of individual generating technol-
ogies.
Such calculations require values for the carbon intensity of each
generator type, which can be combined with the half-hourly Elexon
output data. These intensities are measured in grams of CO2 per kWh
of electricity produced (or equally kg/MWh), and depend on the carbon
content of fuel burnt and the average net generating eﬃciency.
These intensities were estimated using data from DUKES on the
historic electricity output and fuel consumption for the period 1995–
2015 (Janes, 2005; MacLeay et al., 2016). Eﬃciencies for nuclear, coal
and gas are given directly in Table #5.9; however, the latter is a single
eﬃciency for all gas generation (averaging 47.3%) which groups OCGT
and CCGT together.
Using data from #5.5 the net electricity production (gross produc-
tion minus self-consumption) was divided by fuel input for each
generator type. The eﬃciencies calculated for coal and nuclear agreed
with the values from #5.9 to within ± 0.02% each year. The values for
gas were separated out into CCGT and OCGT (see Online Supplement
2), and eﬃciencies for oil and biomass were also calculated. As shown
in Fig. 3 (left), the eﬃciencies for the main generator types have been
relatively stable; whereas those for oil and biomass vary signiﬁcantly
from year to year because of their low utilisation.
Oil is consumed when starting up coal plants, but this cannot be
separated from consumption in oil generators within the DUKES data,
which pulls down the apparent eﬃciency of oil-ﬁred stations in years
they are rarely used. Biomass generation is relatively immature, so both
utilisation and eﬃciency have improved steadily over the last twenty
years. Eﬃciency is rising by 0.6 percentage points per year, and has
improved notably since 2013 when the ﬁrst units of Drax and
Ironbridge were converted from coal to biomass. The right panel of
Fig. 3 shows that both oil and biomass eﬃciency increase by 2.4
percentage points (absolute) with each doubling of annual output.
The eﬃciencies in Fig. 3 appear low relative to the widely quoted
60% for CCGT and > 40% for coal. This is partly because they are
higher heating value (HHV); the industry convention of lower heating
value (LHV) would be a factor of 1.050 higher for coal, 1.058 for oil,
and 1.109 for gas (Staﬀell, 2011). The eﬃciencies are also net of
electricity consumed within the stations, which ranges from 2% of
gross generation for gas, to 5% for coal, 9% for nuclear and 11% for
biomass and oil (calculated from DUKES data).
Table 1 lists the output-weighted average eﬃciency of generation in
Britain and the corresponding carbon intensity of electricity output,
derived using the DUKES emissions factors for fuels.6 It also lists the
estimated carbon intensity of electricity imported from nuclear-rich
France and fossil-rich Netherlands and Ireland. These are presented
against values used elsewhere, notably the Grid Carbon project, which
estimates real-time emissions from the British power system (Rogers
and Parson, 2016).
The carbon intensities estimated for OCGT and oil are 35–55%
higher than used by Grid Carbon, but this has little impact in practice
as these technologies supply < 1% of electricity. The values for coal and
gas are 3% and 9% higher, which has a more substantive impact. The
emissions factors estimated from DUKES are broadly in agreement
with other sources (Weisser, 2007; Schlömer et al., 2014), but diﬀer
slightly from those presented in DUKES Table 5D as they do not
include autogenerators. For validation, multiplying these carbon
intensities with the historic DUKES output from major power produ-
5 In national greenhouse gas statistics, these emissions are attributed to fuel combus-
tion in the industrial and commercial sectors where the auto-generators are located,
rather than to electricity production (DECC, 2016c). 6 321g/kWh for coal, 267g/kWh for oil and 184g/kWh for gas (MacLeay et al., 2015).
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cers yields total carbon emissions from the UK power sector that agree
with DECC to within ± 0.9% ( ± 1.4 MT) across 1996–2015, and to
within ± 0.3% ( ± 0.5 MT) over the last decade.
Multiplying these intensities with Elexon output yields total emis-
sions that are approximately 2% lower than DECC's values. DECC
considers the UK (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland) versus Britain alone: Northern Ireland accounts for around
2.5% of electricity sales (MacLeay et al., 2016) and 2.4% of energy
sector carbon emissions (Aether and Ricardo-AEA, 2015).
Transmission and distribution losses averaged 8.1 ± 0.6% between
1996 and 2015 (inclusive of 0.3% assumed losses due to theft), and
show no discernible trend over time (MacLeay et al., 2016) (#5.1.2).
This increases the values in Table 1 by a factor of 1.088 when
considering the carbon intensity of electricity consumed (as opposed
to electricity generated).
The carbon intensity of nuclear and renewables are taken to be zero,
as the life-cycle emissions from constructing power stations are not
included for any technology. When calibrating emissions estimates to
DECC's national statistics, the carbon intensity of biomass and imports
are taken to be zero, following the ‘production-based’ accounting
convention which attributes these emissions to the country of origin.
An arguably more natural measure of emissions is to use ‘consumption-
based’ accounting, where emissions attributable to electricity demand
are included regardless of where they occur. This approach is now
widely used to better understand country-level emissions by accounting
for imported goods (Barrett et al., 2013).
The average carbon intensity of imported electricity was calculated
using monthly generation data from ENTSO-E (ENTSO-E, 2016) and
annual data from EuroStat (European Commission, 2016), with the
technology emissions factors calculated for Britain in Table 1.7 To test
the validity of these data sources, they were used to calculate the
carbon intensity of British electricity, which gave agreement to DECC's
data to within ± 1.2% for ENTSO-E and ± 3.3% for EuroStat. For each
country, the annual average carbon intensities were calculated, and
applied to the relevant year of British imports / exports. Imports from a
neighbour add to Britain's carbon emissions, while exports are credited
with avoiding production in the neighbouring country, and thus reduce
Britain's emissions (as in consumption-based accounting).
Pumped hydro storage does not create CO2 emissions by itself;
however, the electricity it stores is not carbon-free, and it only
redelivers this electricity with 73.6% round-trip eﬃciency (averaged
over 2009‒15). The carbon intensity of electricity consumed by
pumped hydro plants is 96 ± 5% that of the time-weighted average.
With round-trip losses, these plants deliver electricity with a carbon
intensity 31 ± 9% above the system average (e.g. 474 g/kWh in 2015).
Here these emissions are accounted for when the electricity was ﬁrst
generated, and are attributed to the technologies which produce that
electricity.
The net carbon intensity of biomass is diﬃcult to quantify. Burning
wood releases in the region of 410 g/kWh of chemical energy (National
Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme, 2006); however this should
be absorbed by the next generation of feedstock as it grows (Schlömer
Fig. 3. Historic eﬃciencies for British power stations (against higher heating value, net of self-consumption). The right panel shows the dependence of peaking plant eﬃciency on its
utilisation.
Table 1
Efficiency and carbon intensity of electricity from different sources in Britain. Plant efficiencies are presented gross and net of self-consumption.
Efficiency (HHV) Carbon Intensity (g/kWh)
DUKES (gross) DUKES (net) Grid Carbon This Study Grid Carbon
Coal 36.1 ± 0.6% 34.3 ± 0.5% 35.3% 937 ± 15 910
Oil 32.0 ± 4.2% 28.6 ± 3.6% 43.8% 935 ± 122 610
Gas OCGT 28.8 ± 0.5% 28.3 ± 0.4% 38.3% 651 ± 10 480
Gas CCGT 47.7 ± 0.8% 46.7 ± 0.7% 51.1% 394 ± 6 360
Nuclear 38.2 ± 0.9% 34.8 ± 0.9% 0
Biomass 37.4 ± 4.6% 33.5 ± 4.1% 120 ± 120 300
French Importsa 53 ± 14 90
Dutch Importsb 474 ± 25 550
Irish Importsc 458 ± 15 450
a 76% nuclear, 12% hydro, 6% fossil.
b 58% gas, 26% coal, 5% each of biomass, nuclear and wind.
c 50% gas, 26% coal and lignite, 20% wind.
7 ENTSO-E was the preferred source, with EuroStat used to ﬁll gaps.
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et al., 2014). Legislative requirements for sustainable forest manage-
ment ensure that this cycle of emission and reabsorption is maintained
in order to receive subsidies. For example the UK Renewables
Obligation requires that biomass harvesting maintains the productivity
of the area, and that wood is extracted from the area at a rate which
does not exceed its long term capacity to produce wood (The
Renewables Obligation Order, 2015).
In line with UNFCCC carbon accounting guidelines, emissions from
burning biomass are treated as being zero, as changes in terrestrial
carbon stocks are reported separately and most climate change policies
(including the EU Renewable Energy Directive and Emissions Trading
System) account for lifecycle emissions along the bioenergy supply
chain. There is deep disagreement on whether current accounting
practices are ﬁt for purpose, as “the magnitudes (and even the sign) of
biogenic carbon emissions factors vary considerably over time”
(Matthews et al., 2015). Plausible values range from –2000 to
+2000 g/kWh depending on the scope of the study and the counter-
factual scenario for what would happen to that land and biomass if it
were not used for energy (Stephenson and MacKay, 2014; Aether and
Ricardo-AEA, 2015). Such counterfactuals are diﬃcult if not impos-
sible to accurately predict, signalling the need for strong oversight of
supply chains and forest management (Slade et al., 2014).
Emissions also come from processing and transporting biomass
fuel. Drax estimate its carbon intensity according to their speciﬁc
supply chain; which is predominantly sawmill residues, thinnings and
forest residues from the US and Canada. Their average carbon intensity
was 114 g/kWh in 2015 and 122 g/kWh in 2014 (Drax Group plc,
2015). As Drax is by far the UK's largest consumer of biomass, this is
very close to the UK-wide carbon intensity for biomass electricity,
121 g/kWh, calculated from all consumers of woody biomass, weighted
by the quantity of electricity produced (The Renewables Obligation
Order, 2015.). These values agree with Matthews’ estimate of 127 ±
120 g/kWh for ‘typical’ non-biogenic emissions (Matthews et al.,
2015), and is at the low end of the IPCC and JRC estimates of 230 ±
100 and 245 ± 79 g/kWh (Schlömer et al., 2014; Giuntoli et al., 2015).
Again, the wide uncertainty on these estimates illustrates the complex
nature of biomass supply chains, and suggests there is prudence further
researching the carbon intensity of biomass as it becomes a more
signiﬁcant contributor to decarbonising electricity.
An extension of consumption-based accounting would be to use the
marginal life-cycle emissions, also including the upstream emissions
from producing and transporting fossil fuels. This would increase their
carbon intensity by around 7–10% for coal and 18–34% for gas (much
higher and less precise due to methane leakage) (Schlömer et al., 2014;
Staﬀell et al., 2012; Balcombe et al., 2015). A full LCA approach would
also account for emissions due to the construction of the power stations
themselves, meaning that nuclear and renewables would be notably
greater than zero (10–50 g/kWh)(Schlömer et al., 2014). This is not
justiﬁable though in the short-term, as a windy day will result in more
electricity produced from wind farms, but not in more concrete and
steel being consumed.
3. Results: statistics from the British power sector
3.1. Demand
Net annual electricity demand, as measured by National Grid, has
fallen from 315 to 281 TWh between 2009 and 2015, an average rate of
1.9% per year. Part of this is due to embedded renewables, which have
grown from 6 to 18 TWh output per year and register as negative
demand. Accounting for this, actual electricity demand is still falling by
1.3% per year. Fig. 4 charts the reduction in demand, set against
temperature on an inverted scale to highlight their relationship. This is
partly due to the 2.75 million homes with electric heating (Palmer and
Cooper, 2013).
December's average temperature has risen steadily from 3.2 °C in
2009 to a record-breaking 9.7 °C in 2015, which has contributed to
peak demand falling 11% over this period from 59.5 to 53.0 GW.
Average winter demand is falling at more than three times the rate of
summer demand: with a fall of 6.6 GW since 2009/10 to 36.6 GW in
winter 2015/16 (Dec–Feb), compared with a fall of 2.2 to 30.9 GW in
summer 2015 (Jun–Aug).
3.2. Capacity
Fig. 5 shows the installed capacity mix over the period, which is
dominated by around 32 GW of gas and 28 GW of coal, followed by
11 GW of nuclear and 7 GW of peaking plant at their respective
zeniths. Hydro has remained constant at 4 GW (1.1 GW run-of-river
and 2.9 GW pumped storage), while interconnection has risen from
2.4 GW (with France and Ireland) to 4.0 GW (with Netherlands and
Northern Ireland). Renewables are growing rapidly: wind increased
from 2.3 to 14.6 GW over 7½ years, solar from 50 MW at the start of
2011 to 10.5 GW by the end of June 2016, and biomass from nothing
to 2.2 GW over the same period.
While combined renewable capacity has grown from 2 to 27 GW,
combined fossil capacity has fallen from a peak of 65 GW in 2011 to
just 45 GW in 2016. Britain has lost half of its coal in just 3½ years:
13.6 GW of coal closed between January 2013 and June 2016,8 either
because it had opted out of the large combustion plant directive (LCPD)
(Gross et al., 2014), or because it had become loss-making. Peaking
plant consisted of 3.1 GW of oil which retired during 2013 and 3.7 GW
of OCGTs, half of which retired during 2015. Despite total installed
capacity rising to 90 GW at the end of 2015, conventional thermal
capacity (excluding wind, solar, hydro and interconnectors) had fallen
to 58.5 GW, 20% below its peak at the start of 2012.
Fig. 5 also shows the utilisation of the main generator types.
Historically, thermal capacity factors were high: averaging 75% for
nuclear, 67% for CCGT and 53% for coal over the period 1997–2006
(MacLeay et al., 2016). Utilisation has fallen dramatically in recent
years due to shrinking demand and the rise of renewables. The average
utilisation of gas CCGTs fell from 75% in the winter of 2010 to an
average of 32% since 2012. Three years on, coal plants are now
suﬀering a similar fate, falling steadily from a temporary high of 70%
to below 10% in the summer of 2016. For the ﬁrst time, coal has a
lower capacity factor than solar.
Averaged over the seven whole years 2009‒15, the average and
standard deviation in capacity factors for wind and solar were 30.3 ±
3.4% and 10.2 ± 0.6% respectively. At the monthly level wind and solar
are strongly anti-correlated (R=–0.66), and during summer months
(Jun–Aug) their capacity factors average 21.0% and 16.2%, while
during winter months (Dec–Feb) they average 37.9% and 3.5%
respectively.
3.3. Generation
Fig. 6 shows the average generation mix across each week of the last
7½ years. Over this period fossil fuels have become increasingly
squeezed by the growth of imports, biomass, wind and solar. Coal is
seen responding to seasonal changes in demand, and displaced gas
over the second half of 2011. Gas generation fell steadily from an
average of 17.3 GW in 2009–10 to just 9.3 GW in 2012–13. This trend
reversed over the course of 2015 with gas generation rising from an
average of 9.0 GW in the ﬁrst quarter of 2015 to 13.8 GW in the ﬁrst
quarter of 2016. By May 2016 coal generation fell to an average of just
1.1 GW, and on the 10th of May instantaneous coal output fell to zero
for the ﬁrst in over 130 years.
Fig. 7 shows the half-hourly proﬁle of generation averaged over all
8 In 2013: Kingsnorth, Didcot A, Cockenzie, Tilbury. In 2014: Ferrybridge C (1‒2),
Uskmouth B. In 2016: Ironbridge B, Longannet, Ferrybridge C (3–4), Rugeley B.
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days in a given month. The four plots contrast summer and winter in
the earliest and most recent years. Several features are worth comment.
Demand (shown by the black line) has fallen sharply, and fossil fuels
are being crowded out. This is particularly evident with December:
between 2009 and 2015, demand was 7.3 GW lower, while coal and gas
output fell by 7.1 and 11.3 GW respectively.
Wind output has grown substantially to average 2.7 GW in June
and 5.8 GW in December 2015. It appears smooth over all hours due to
the charts averaging across many days; if instead single days were
plotted then signiﬁcant variability would be seen. Solar also provides a
signiﬁcant chunk of demand during summer daytimes, creating a new
‘multi-shifting’ proﬁle for thermal plants. Gas plants are now seen to
ramp up for peaks in both the morning and evening, with lower
demand at night and (increasingly) during the daytime. Finally, the
emergence of biomass and growth of imports are notable, as is the
elimination of net exports, which were seen during 2009 where the
black demand line falls below the shaded area.
Fig. 8 shows the share of demand that was met by each technology
in each month. The left panel splits technologies into categories, with
zero-carbon above the axis and with-carbon below to highlight the shift
between them. The right panel shows the breakdown of renewable
technologies.
Fossil fuels have gone from supplying 83% of British electricity in
January 2009 to just 45% in December 2015; their share has fallen on
average by 4 percentage points a year. Nuclear has remained steadfast
at 20% of the grid mix, while renewables have grown from 4% to a peak
Fig. 4. Electricity demand and temperature in Britain aggregated to weekly averages.
Fig. 5. Installed generating capacity (left) and average utilisation of major thermal plants (right). The dotted line shows monthly utilisation for coal plants, while the solid line shows the
deseasonalised trend. Historic solar data from (Pfenninger and Staﬀell, 2016).
Fig. 6. Generation mix in Britain aggregated to weekly averages. Areas below the horizontal axis signify exports from Britain.
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of 25% in December 2015, averaging 19% over the whole of 2015. The
second half of December 2015 saw wind overtake coal to supply 20%
vs. 13% of electricity. May 2016 then saw coal supply less than wind,
biomass or solar for the ﬁrst time. Imports have grown steadily from
being net-zero in 2009–10 to 7% of British demand by 2015, as the
price diﬀerential between Britain and its neighbours grows. Biomass
jumped from 2.5% to 5% share in July 2015, producing more energy
than wind for two weeks of the year. During the ﬁrst half of 2016,
biomass supplied 30% of Britain's renewable electricity. Hydro has
remained constant at around 1% of supply, while wind and solar have
risen to contribute 11% and 3% of demand over 2015. Wind peaked at
a 17% share during December (averaging 5.8 GW output, 40% capacity
factor), while solar reached a share of 6% in June 2015 (1.8 GW output,
20% capacity factor).
Constraints on the transmission system mean that not all of this
wind output can be used. From analysis of Elexon's data, 0.4% of wind
generation was constrained between 2011 and 2013, averaging 6 GWh
per month. This rose sharply in 2013 to 1.8% (42 GWh per month) due
to the network upgrades taking some transmission assets out of service
(National Audit Oﬃce, 2014), and has risen further to 3.3% in 2015. At
its peak, 7.3% of wind generation was constrained in December 2015
(311 GWh, equivalent to a constant 420 MW).
Fig. 9 shows peak renewable output, depicting the contribution of
each technology during the half-hour period with the greatest percen-
tage supply from renewables. Peak output is roughly twice the average,
and is growing at 5 percentage points per year, from 9% to 44%.
The increase in biomass output in the second half of 2015 is
evident, while the contribution from hydro is decreasing during these
periods as it is dispatchable, and so operators ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to
not generate during periods of low demand and high renewables. Solar
started playing a major role since 2015, with a peak output of 7.0 GW
compared to 9.3 GW from wind. During 2015, wind provided a peak of
33% of total supply (19-Nov), and solar provided 20% (07-Jun). As the
two are uncorrelated, their combined total was 40% (06-Jun).
Fig. 7. The average daily proﬁle of generation at half-hourly resolution in June and December, comparing 2009 and 2015.
Fig. 8. Monthly average share of generation from conventional and renewable sources.
Fig. 9. The peak share of supply from renewables during each month.
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3.4. System extremes
The rise of intermittent renewables means the gap between mini-
mum and maximum net demand is widening. A major concern in
recent years has been with meeting peak winter demand, and it is
widely known that wind cannot be relied upon to produce at peak times
(Gross et al., 2006). Fig. 10 gives a measure of how dependable
diﬀerent generators are for providing peak capacity. The ﬁgure shows
their output as a percentage of installed capacity during the ten half-
hour periods with highest demand in each of the last seven calendar
years. Shaded bars give the average and thin lines the standard
deviation within each year, so for example, wind power operated at a
20 ± 13% capacity factor during the highest demand hours in 2015.
Nuclear plants have operated at between 69% and 85% of full
output during peak demand periods, while coal has averaged 83 ± 7%.
Gas was similar during 2009–10 but has fallen since, presumably as
there is less need for peak capacity while demand is falling rather than
worsening reliability. Biomass operated above 90% during 2015,
although this was almost entirely due to the output of one plant (Drax).
In contrast, Britain's wind farms produce anything from 7% to 82%
of their full capacity during peak hours, depending on whether high
demand happens to coincide with high wind speeds. The average over
all years is 33 ± 23%, implying that a 10% capacity factor can be
expected during at least ﬁve out of six peak demand hours. This agrees
with the lower end of estimations for the ‘capacity credit’ that wind
oﬀers to power systems, with results from a dozen studies sitting in the
range of 10–30% (Gross et al., 2006). Solar power does not provide any
assistance during peak demand periods in Britain as demand peaks in
winter evenings.
Interconnectors might naturally be expected to import during times
of peak demand, but these only provide 35 ± 25% of their capacity
(weighted by their relative size). Breaking this down further: the
interconnectors to France and the Netherlands operate at 62 ± 34%
and 86 ± 18%, pumped storage at 51 ± 12%, and the interconnectors to
the Irish system actually export at British peak times, providing –54 ±
28%. Demand in Ireland peaks at the same time as in Britain, and
being the more isolated system, Ireland is in greater need of imports.
Going forwards, peak winter demand may be superseded by the
summer net minimum as the greatest challenge to the system. Security
of supply has traditionally focussed on ensuring enough plants are
available to meet peak demand, but now the reverse situation must be
considered as the capacity of must-run nuclear and variable renewables
Fig. 10. The average capacity factor of generators during the top ten demand periods in each year from 2009 (left edge of each group) to 2015 (right edge).
Fig. 11. Supply mix during the half-hour period with maximum and minimum net demand within each week. Areas below the horizontal axis signify exports from Britain.
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edges closer to double the level of minimum demand.
Fig. 11 shows the supply mix during the period when demand net of
variable renewables (and thus output from conventional generators)
was highest and lowest in each week. The output from wind and solar is
still included in the ﬁgure to show their contribution relative to falling
demand.
Meeting maximum demand has become easier to meet in recent
years, with less recourse to peaking generation, although this is in part
due to milder weather. Operations are getting ever tighter during
periods of minimum demand, as the output from ﬂexible fossil plants is
getting compressed between renewables and nuclear.
Boxing Day 2016 saw the lowest output from ﬂexible generators:
demand net of wind, solar and nuclear was 5949 MW; down nearly
2 GW on the minimum in the previous year, 60% lower than in 2012.
This net minimum has fallen by 1059 MW per year, so this headroom
may be eliminated as early as 2020. Operational issues around inertia
and frequency response may well arise before then.
3.5. Prices
The increasing share of intermittent renewables is impacting on
wholesale prices, which are plotted in Fig. 12. Prices averaged £44.44
± 5.77/MWh over the period, and while the weekly average rarely
moves outside the window of £30‒50/MWh, half-hourly prices are
becoming more volatile.
The daily spread9 has always been higher in winter than summer,
but this discrepancy is growing. Considering the winter half-year
(October through March), the daily spread averaged £37.36/MWh
from 2009/10 to 2011/12, £48.41 from 2012/13 to 2014/15, then
jumped to £80.75 in the winter of 2015/16.
The merit order eﬀect of renewables is evident in Britain although
not especially strong. The wholesale price weighted by wind output is
94.8 ± 2.1%10 that of the energy-weighted price, and this is almost
stationary ove rtime. The solar weighted price is higher at 102.4 ±
6.7%, but is declining by 2.4% per year.
2015 was the ﬁrst year to see negative prices in Britain. There were
ﬁve negative-price periods across two days in May, followed by 4 in
November and 16 in December. Half of these occurred between 2:30
and 4:30 AM, and all lay between midnight and 11:00 AM. Prices
during these hours averaged –£34 ± 19/ MWh, with several hours
sticking at –£35, –£40 and –£50/MWh. As could be expected, demand
was low and wind output was high during these hours, averaging 23.2
± 2.0 and 5.9 ± 0.9 GW respectively (a 41 ± 5% capacity factor for
wind). During the ﬁrst half of 2016, there were a further 87 periods
with zero or negative prices, averaging ‒£23 ± 21/ MWh, going down to
a low of ‒£100/MWh. Negative prices also started occurring in groups,
with two days when prices were ≤£0 for 4½ hours in a row.
The cost of balancing is increasing in line with installed wind and
solar capacity. The BSUoS charge has increased at a rate of £0.17/
MWh per year, from an average of £1.33/MWh in 2009 to £2.24/MWh
in 2015. The number of days with a BSUoS price of over £5/MWh has
increased from 15 per year during 2009–12 to over 100 in 2015.
4. Analysis: contributions to carbon reduction
The carbon intensity of electricity is an important metric, widely
used for assessing the impacts of electric vehicles, electric heating,
microgeneration and demand reduction on national emissions.
Government departments and other organisations use various average
carbon intensities for British electricity, ranging from 412 to 525 g/
kWh (DECC, 2016a; Carbon Trust, 2011; BRE, 2014). Fig. 13 plots the
weekly average carbon intensity, with the range of half-hourly values
seen within each week.
The carbon content of British electricity recently peaked at 508 g/
kWh in 2012, and has since fallen 30% in three years. The unseason-
ably warm December combined with high wind output led the last two
weeks of 2015 to have the lowest ever carbon intensity, averaging
235 g/kWh, with a minimum of 150 g/kWh.
4.1. Weather and eﬃciency
To separate out the variability of the weather from other factors
aﬀecting electricity demand, Fig. 14 shows the relationship between
electricity demand and temperature. Points show the daily averages
across each working day, excluding weekends and bank holidays, when
demand is depressed by 12.5% (~4.75 GW) on average. 2010 and 2015
are highlighted as the coldest and warmest years, which also had the
highest and lowest demand respectively in the period studied, and
smoothed lines were ﬁtted to them using a non-parametric LOESS
regression.
Correcting for temperature, demand on working days in 2015 was
on average 3.0 GW lower than in 2010; being 2.6 GW lower when
temperatures were above 10 °C and 3.9 GW lower when they were
below 5 °C. The savings on non-working days are much lower, so these
values are around 20% lower when averaged over all days of the year. It
is clear that societal changes such as eﬃciency improvements and de-
industrialisation are having a signiﬁcant impact on demand, reducing
electricity demand by 21 TWh per year.
The temperature sensitivity of electricity demand is almost un-
changed over this period. For each degree that temperature falls below
15 °C national demand increased by 823 MW in 2010, and 819 MW in
2015, averaged across all working days. This stands in sharp contrast to
France, where this sensitivity has increased 50% in the space of ten
years to a 2.6 GW increase per degree centigrade, due to increased use
Fig. 12. Wholesale electricity prices over the period (in £/MWh), showing the weekly average and spread.
9 Deﬁned as the range from minimum to maximum half-hourly price in a given day.
10 Standard deviation across monthly averages.
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of electric heating (Boßmann and Staﬀell, 2015). Based on the British
sensitivity, a further 9 TWh of the demand reduction from 2010 to
2015 can be attributed to the milder weather.
Perhaps more importantly, mild weather is also causing the low
peak demands seen in recent years. Comparing December 2010 and
2015, the peak demand due to heating fell from 14.5 to 6.2 GW. While
this is a crude calculation, based on daily-average temperatures and an
empirical estimate for the temperature sensitivity of demand, it high-
lights Britain's luck that mild winters have coincided with a much-
feared shortage of winter capacity to avoid potential shortfalls.
4.2. Share of emissions by source
Fig. 15 shows the carbon emissions by fuel type, showing clearly
that the reduction since 2012 is due to falling coal consumption.
Emissions from gas generation had been below 35 MT per year since
2012, but look set to return to their pre-2010 levels of around 50–55
MT. If gas consumption remains at current levels then Britain's CCGTs
can remain part of the system down to a decarbonisation of two-thirds
below 2010 levels. Further decarbonisation would require either
unabated gas generation to reduce, or the gas itself to be decarbonised.
The emissions from peaking plants (oil and OCGT) are grouped
with other sources in the left panel of Fig. 15, and by themselves have
contributed less than 1% to emissions since 2012. Annual statistics
from DUKES reveal this is part of a longer trend: emissions from
peaking plants have fallen steadily from 16 MT (9%) in 1995 to 6 MT in
2005 (4%) and an estimated 0.5 MT in 2015 (0.5%). This may allay
environmental concerns over the proliferation of OCGT and diesel
generators in recent years to provide peaking capacity.
The UK carbon budgets do not account for emissions that are
released abroad, either from imported electricity or imported biomass.
Fig. 15 estimates the contribution these would have made each year,
based on the emissions factors given in Table 1. In 2009 and 2010,
Britain's exports to Ireland resulted in net savings of 0.7‒0.9 MTCO2;
however, since 2011 the growing imports from the Netherlands, and
shrinking exports to Ireland mean Britain is exporting more of its
emissions abroad (4.1 MT to Netherlands, and 0.5 from Ireland to
France in 2015). The non-biogenic emissions from processing and
transporting biomass have also risen since 2012 to 1.3 MT.
Consumption-based accounting would raise Britain's emissions from
103.0 to 108.3 MT in 2015, or 343–360 g/kWh.
4.3. Impact of renewables
The amount of carbon saved by intermittent renewables depends on
how the rest of the system responds to their pattern of output. Not all
power stations reduce their output equally when the wind blows or the
sun shines; typically gas and coal will turn down, imports will decrease,
and energy storage may be recharged, whereas nuclear and biomass
will be unaﬀected. Previously, Cullen estimated that wind displaces a
mix of 18% coal and 85% gas in Texas, saving 496 ± 66 kg of CO2 per
MWh of wind output (Cullen, 2013), while Thomson estimated a 60%
coal, 40% gas mix for Britain over the period 2008‒13, saving 628 kg/
MWh (Thomson, 2014). There are no known estimates for the margin-
al impact of solar.
The emissions saved by an additional MWh of output from wind
and solar are estimated using a multivariate regression on the changes
that occur between each half-hour period, as proposed by Hawkes
(Hawkes, 2010). In Eq. (1), the change in emissions between each
adjacent half hour period (ΔEt) is regressed against the change in wind
and solar output (ΔWt and ΔSt) and in the level of demand (ΔDt). The
coeﬃcients for each variable, ω, σandδ, give the marginal emissions
factors for wind, solar and demand respectively. α is a constant oﬀset,
and ϵt is the error term.
∆E =α+ω∆W+σ∆S +δ∆D +ϵt t t t t (1)
Furthermore, the speciﬁc mix of power stations that are
displaced by wind and solar was estimated by replacing the changes
in carbon emissions (ΔEt in Eq. (1)) with the changes in output
from each type of adjustable generation in turn (nuclear, biomass,
gas, coal, imports and hydro). Details of each regression and full
results are given in the Online Supplement 3, and a summary is
given below.
The study is split into two time periods: 2009–12 when there was
insuﬃcient solar capacity (≤1 GW) to yield statistically signiﬁcant
results, and 2013–16 when both wind and solar could be studied
together. In both periods the carbon impact of renewables is similar to
that of reducing demand. During 2009–12, CO2 emissions rose by 549
Fig. 13. The carbon intensity of British electricity, showing the average and range for each week. Biannual averages (in g/kWh) are listed above the x-axis.
Fig. 14. Correlation between daily average temperature and electricity demand, high-
lighting the reduction in demand from 2010 to 2015.
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± 1 kg for each 1 MWh increase in demand, and fell by 532 ± 12 kg for
each 1 MWh increase in wind output. Between January 2013 and June
2016, CO2 emissions rose by 440 ± 1 kg per MWh increase in demand,
and fell by 435 ± 5 kg and 435 ± 4 kg per MWh increase in wind and
solar output.
Table 2 summarises the marginal grid mix that responds to
changes in demand, wind and solar output over the two periods. A
very similar mix of plants reacts to wind and solar, which is in turn
similar to that which reacts to demand. This is perhaps to be
expected given that there is a speciﬁc mix of technologies which
have the ﬂexibility to respond. Fossil plants and interconnectors
primarily adjust their output: since 2013 it is approximately 60%
gas, 20% coal and 17.5% imports/storage. Hydro accommodates
around 2.5%, while biomass and nuclear are virtually unaﬀected.
The standard errors on these results are all below ± 1%, and below
± 0.1% for hydro, biomass and nuclear.
Whilst the emissions and mix of plants displaced by wind and solar
appear to be very similar in Table 2, their variation over time would
suggest otherwise. Fig. 16 shows the results when these regressions
were performed independently on each half-year (for the grid mix) and
month (for the emissions). Solar appears to follow quite a diﬀerent
pattern over time, but when averaged over 2013‒16 it displaces a
similar amount of CO2 per MWh.
Wind appears to be broadly equivalent to negative demand in terms
of displaced carbon emissions. Marginal emissions fell by around 1/3
between 2010 and 2013 as gas gradually replaced coal as the primary
component of the marginal grid mix. Comparing back to Fig. 2, this
shift occurred two years earlier than the gas replacing coal in the
average grid mix.
(Hawkes, 2010) calculated the marginal emissions factor of British
demand to be 652 kg/MWh from 2002‒09, speculating that it could
reduce to 482 kg/MWh by 2025 due to plant retirements.11 This fall
has occurred much faster than anticipated, with the marginal emissions
of demand averaging 440 kg/MWh since 2013.
The long-run average capacity factor of British wind farms is 30.0%
onshore and 35.8% oﬀshore (Staﬀell and Pfenninger, 2016), so 1 GW
of onshore wind should produce 2.628 TWh and save 1.14 MTCO2 per
year, and 1 GW of oﬀshore wind would produce 3.136 TWh and save
1.36 MTCO2 per year. Solar PV achieves an average 10.2% capacity
factor (Pfenninger and Staﬀell, 2016), so 1 GW of solar panels should
produce 0.891 TWh, and save 0.39 MTCO2.
4.4. Impact of fuel and carbon prices
Fig. 17 shows fuel and carbon prices going back to 2000, putting the
volatility of recent years into context. The left panel shows the
estimated cost of fuel with and without carbon. The average price of
fuel purchased by major power producers is divided by their average
thermal eﬃciency to give the cost of fuel per unit electricity output, and
the carbon intensity is multiplied by the prevailing carbon price.
The price of gas and coal (including carbon emissions) stayed
roughly in line until 2011 as they are reasonable substitutes for one
another. During 2012 and 13, the arrival of cheap imports from the US
meant coal fell to around 60% of the cost of gas on a per-MWh-
generated basis. Coal consumption in Britain could not rise suﬃciently
for their prices to equalise, both because many coal plants were
constrained to limited running hours due to the Large Combustion
Plant Directive (LCPD), and building new coal stations was considered
too risky (or in fact illegal) due to climate policy.
The right panel of Fig. 17 uses the diﬀerence between fuel prices to
calculate the carbon price that would be required to equalise the cost of
generation from coal and gas.12 Before 2005 this was negligible (£3.50
± 2.90/TCO2) as fuel prices were pegged to one another. Gas prices
rose in 2005–06 due to tightening global supply, so averaged over the
period of 2005–11 a carbon price of £16.20 was necessary, which is
approximately what the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) delivered
(£13.80). Since then gas prices rose further whilst coal prices fell, and
oversupply on the ETS collapsed the carbon price. At its peak in winter
2012/13 a carbon price of £49.30/T would have been required to
incentivise fuel switching from coal to gas, but this has gradually eased
oﬀ over the last three years. At the same time, the UK's Carbon Price
Floor came into eﬀect, raising the carbon price from £6 to £18 per
Fig. 15. Breakdown of annual carbon emissions by source, annual to 2009, biannual to H1 2016 (left), with the share coming from sources not considered in national statistics (right).
Table 2
The change in output (in MWh) from conventional generators to a 1 MWh increase in
demand, wind and solar; when regressed over 2009‒12 (left) and 2013‒16 (right).
The
impact of
→ On ↓
+1 MWh
demand
+1
MWh
wind
The
impact of
→On ↓
+1 MWh
demand
+1
MWh
wind
+1
MWh
solar
Coal 0.429 ‒0.379 Coal 0.220 ‒0.198 ‒0.186
Gas 0.367 ‒0.403 Gas 0.600 ‒0.592 ‒0.592
Imports 0.186 ‒0.206 Imports 0.155 ‒0.186 ‒0.178
Hydro 0.018 ‒0.015 Hydro 0.020 ‒0.022 ‒0.029
Biomass 0.000 ‒0.001 Biomass 0.004 ‒0.002 ‒0.006
Nuclear 0.000 0.002 Nuclear 0.000 0.003 ‒0.006
11 These values are for gross generation for compatibility with the rest of this paper,
Hawkes presented values with 5.5% transmission and distribution losses subtracted.
12 This is calculated as the diﬀerence between the cost of gas and coal per MWh
electricity produced, divided by the diﬀerence between their carbon intensities.
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tonne at the start of 2016; which has all but eliminated the gap between
fuel prices, suggesting that some generators will have started switching
in the merit order.
5. Conclusions
The British electricity system is in a radical period of change which
has seen carbon emissions fall 46% in the space of three years. Since
2012, demand has fallen steadily and coal's share of generation has
plummeted, displaced by gas, imports, biomass, wind and solar. Peak
demand has not (yet) compromised system reliability, despite installed
thermal capacity falling by 20 GW. However, minimum demand is
instead rapidly becoming an issue as it approaches the point where
intermittent renewables and inﬂexible nuclear collide.
These changes stem from a conﬂuence of many factors, some that
can be steered by policy, some that are simply beyond our control.
Demand for electricity is falling, partly due to the energy intensity of
the economy (and in turn eﬃciency improvement), partly due to
unseasonably warm weather (perhaps inﬂuenced by climate change).
Generation from coal peaked in 2012 as the carbon price collapsed
and gas prices rose to double the level of coal per unit output. This
global phenomenon was inﬂuenced both by tight gas supply in the wake
of the Japanese earthquake and cheap coal exported from America that
was displaced from their power stations by the shale gas revolution. By
2015, electricity generation from coal had fallen to its lowest absolute
level since 1955 (when demand was much lower and before the ﬁrst
nuclear reactors were built), whilst the UK's production of coal has
receded back to pre-industrial levels (DECC, 2015). The introduction of
the UK Carbon Price Floor and its rapid rise to triple the level of the EU
Emissions Trading System has brought coal and gas prices in line with
one another again, making fuel switching commercially viable.
Coal and oil have also been pushed oﬀ the system directly by clean
air legislation, with plants forced to retire because of the Large
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and the Industrial Emissions
Directive (IED). They have also suﬀered indirectly as biomass, wind
and solar deployment have been supported through Renewables
Obligation Certiﬁcates and Contracts for Diﬀerences. Imports have
also risen, both because more interconnection has come online, and
because British electricity prices have become higher than those on the
continent.
Many of these changes have been inﬂuenced by policies set at the
European level: the 20-20-20 targets for renewable energy, the LCPD
and IED, and the international emissions trading scheme. With the
UK's decision to leave Europe, it is unclear whether these policies will
be retained in the long-term. Retracting any of them is likely to
increase Britain's carbon emissions; however, with the Carbon Price
Floor Britain has shown the will to go further than European incentives
to decarbonise, with impressive eﬀect.
This paper compiles publically available data from various sources
to help illustrate the transition that Britain's power sector is under-
going, to hopefully inform and enlighten the debate on how this
transition will continue.
Fig. 16. The mix of generators (left) and CO2 emissions (right) displaced by an additional MWh of wind and solar output. The shaded areas around each line represent the standard
error on the monthly estimates, and the added emissions from an extra MWh of demand are shown for comparison.
Fig. 17. The cost of fuel and emissions per unit of electricity output (left), and a comparison of the actual carbon price and the price required for coal and gas generators to have equal
costs (right). Data from (Ares, 2014; DECC, 2016b; ICE, 2016).
I. Staﬀell Energy Policy 102 (2017) 463–475
474
Acknowledgements
This work was used in developing the Electric Insights reports and
website (www.electricinsights.co.uk), commissioned by Drax Group
plc. No employee of Drax or any other commercial or government body
had the opportunity to contribute towards or inﬂuence the content of
this paper. I thank National Grid and Elexon for freely providing the
data which made this work possible.
Support from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC) via the project “Maximising the Carbon Impact of
Wind Power” (EP/N005996/1) is gratefully acknowledged. I thank
Richard Green, Rob Gross, Tim Green, Raphael Slade, Clara
Heuberger, Keith Bell, Oliver Schmidt and Ajay Gambhir for discussing
earlier drafts of this paper, Kate Ward for assistance with data cleaning,
Graeme Hawker for advice on using Elexon's constraint data, and
Robert Staﬀell for proof-reading.
Appendix A. Supporting information
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the
online version at doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.037.
References
Aether & Ricardo-AEA, 2015. Greenhouse Gas Inventories for England, Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland: 1990–2013. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/decc-daghgi〉
Ares, E., 2014. House of Commons Reserach Brieﬁng – Carbon Price Floor. See 〈http://
tinyurl.com/SN05927〉
Balcombe, P., Anderson, K., Speirs, J., Brandon, N., Hawkes, A., 2015. Methane and CO2
emissions from the natural gas supply chain. Sustain. Gas. Inst..
Barrett, J., Peters, G., Wiedmann, T., Scott, K., Lenzen, M., Roelich, K., Le Quéré, C.,
2013. Consumption-based GHG emission accounting: a UK case study. Clim. Policy
13 (4), 451–470.
Boßmann, T., Staﬀell, I., 2015. The shape of future electricity demand: exploring load
curves in 2050s Germany and Britain. Energy 90 (Part 2 No), 1317–1333.
BRE, 2014. SAP 2012. The Government’s Standard Assessment Procedure for Energy
Rating of Dwellings, version 9.92. See 〈www.bre.co.uk/sap2012〉
Carbon Trust, 2011. Conversion Factors. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/carbontrust-ctl153〉
CCC, 2015a. The ﬁfth carbon budget: the next step towards a low-carbon economy.
Comm. Clim. Change.
CCC, 2015b. Sectoral scenarios for the ﬁfth carbon budget. Committee on climate change.
Clim. Change Act. 2008 (2008c), 27 , (See)〈http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2008/27〉.
Cullen, J., 2013. Measuring the environmental beneﬁts of wind-generated electricity.
Am. Econ. J.: Econ. Policy 5 (4), 107–133.
DECC, 2015. Historical electricity data: 1920 to 2015. See 〈https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/electricity-statistics〉
DECC, 2016a. Government emission conversion factors for greenhouse gas company
reporting. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/decc-ghgf〉
DECC, 2016b. Quarterly Energy Prices, March 2016. See 〈www.gov.uk/government/
collections/quarterly-energy-prices〉
DECC, 2016c. UK Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Final Figures. See 〈https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/uk-greenhouse-gas-emissions-statistics〉
Drax Group plc, 2015. Annual report and accounts. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/gsfqo2e〉
Elexon, 2016a. BMRS Webservices Information. See 〈http://www.bmreports.com/bsp/
additional/soapserver.php〉
Elexon, 2016b. Elexon Portal. See 〈https://www.elexonportal.co.uk〉
ENTSO-E, 2016. Data Portal > Production Data (Detailed Monthly Production). See
〈https://www.entsoe.eu/data/data-portal/production/〉
European Commission, 2016. Eurostat Database: Supply, transformation and
consumption of electricity [nrg_105a]. See 〈http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/
database〉
Giuntoli, J., Agostini, A., Edwards, R., Marelli, L., 2015. Solid and gaseous bioenergy
pathways: input values and GHG emissions. Eur. Comm. Jt. Cent..
Green, R., Staﬀell, I., 2016. Electricity in Europe: exiting fossil fuels? Oxf. Rev. Econ.
Policy 32 (2), 282–303.
Gross, R., Heptonstall, P., Anderson, D., Green, T., Leach, M., Skea, J., 2006. The costs
and impacts of intermittency. UKERC.
Gross, R., Speirs, J., Hawkes, A., Skillings, S., Heptonstall, P., 2014. Could retaining old
coal lead to a policy own goal?
Hawkes, A.D., 2010. Estimating marginal CO2 emissions rates for national electricity
systems. Energy Policy 38 (10), 5977–5987.
ICE, 2016. EUA Futures – Emissions Index. See 〈https://www.theice.com/marketdata/
reports/82〉
International Energy Agency, 2010. Power Generation from Coal: Measuring and
Reporting Eﬃciency, Performance and CO2 Emissions.
Janes, M., 2005. Digest of UK Energy Statistics: Chapter 5. National Statistics.
MacLeay, I., Harris, K., Annut, A., 2015. Digest of UK Energy Statistics: annex A. Natl.
Stat..
MacLeay, I., Harris, K., Annut, A., 2016. Digest of UK Energy Statistics: chapter 5. Natl.
Stat..
Matthews, R., Mortimer, N., Lesschen, J.P., Lindroos, T.J., Sokka, L., Morris, A., , et al.
2015. Carbon impacts of biomass consumed in the EU: quantitative assessment. The
European Commission DG ENER/C1/427.
National Audit Oﬃce, 2014. Electricity Balancing Services.
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories ProgrammeNational, 2006. Stationary
Combustion. In: Eggleston, S., Buendia, L., Miwa, K., Ngara, T., Tanabe, K. (Eds.),
2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventorieshttp://tinyurl.com/
m6v3bs.
National Grid, 2016. Electricity Transmission Operational Data > Data Explorer. See
〈http://tinyurl.com/ng-data-explorer〉
Ofgem, 2011. Typical domestic energy consumption ﬁgures. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/
ofgem-f96〉
Palmer, J., Cooper, I., 2013. United Kingdom housing energy fact ﬁle, London. Dep.
Energy Clim. Change.
Parker, D.E., Legg, T.P., Folland, C.K., 1992. A new daily central England temperature
series, 1772–1991. Int. J. Climatol. (12 No.), 317–342 〈http://tinyurl.com/hadcet〉.
Pfenninger, S., Staﬀell, I., 2016. Long-term patterns of European PV output using 30
years of validated hourly reanalysis and satellite data. Energy, 114, 1251–1265.
Rogers, A., Parson, O., 2016. GridCarbon. See 〈http://gridcarbon.uk/〉
Schlömer, S., Bruckner, T., Fulton, L., Hertwich, E., McKinnon, A., Perczyk, D., et al.,
2014. Annex III: technology-speciﬁc cost and performance parameters. In:
Edenhofer, O., Pichs-Madruga, R., Sokona, Y., Farahani, E., Kadner, S., Seyboth, K.
(Eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of
Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press.
Slade, R., Bauen, A., Gross, R., 2014. Global bioenergy resources. Nat. Clim. Change 4
(2), 99–105.
Staﬀell, I., 2010. Fuel cells for domestic heat and power: Are they worth it?, (Ph.D.
thesis), University of Birmingham. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/fcchp-worth-it〉
Staﬀell, I., 2011. The Energy and Fuel Data Sheet. See 〈http://tinyurl.com/energy-fuel-
data-sheet〉
Staﬀell, I., Pfenninger, S., 2016. Using bias-corrected reanalysis to simulate current and
future wind power output. Energy (114 No.), 1224–1239.
Staﬀell, I., Ingram, A., Kendall, K., 2012. Energy and carbon payback times for solid
oxide fuel cell based domestic CHP. Int. J. Hydrog. Energy 37 (3), 2509–2523.
Stephenson, A.L., MacKay, D.J.C., 2014. Life Cycle Impacts of Biomass Electricity in
2020. DECC URN 14D/243.
The Renewables Obligation Order, 2015. 2015 No. 1947. See 〈http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/uksi/2015/1947/contents/made〉
Thomson, R.C., 2014. Carbon and Energy Payback of Variable Renewable Generation
(PhD Thesis). University of Edinburgh.
Weisser, D., 2007. A guide to life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from electric
supply technologies. Energy 32 (9), 1543–1559.
I. Staﬀell Energy Policy 102 (2017) 463–475
475
